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ARGUMENT 
.'•••-. • flimco' i! tji.ii.if attempts ti' \ onfiiBf1 the lacth and issues 
before the Court by making arguments which are not consistent 
with the record and which have no 1egaJ basis. After the smoke 
is cleared i 1: i E s i g n i f:i cant to no t:e tha t Ei mco di d not and 
cannot refute the major arguments raised by C H in its initial 
brief that the district court' s orders were illegal and vc i d as 
!:  ::» C I I a n d i t s a s s e t s .. ' • • . •. . • 
Eimco does not dispute the fact that it never brought 
any action nor: obtained any judgment against C-H to justify the 
seizure )f I '. H K pi opt:1 I i , C H was not a party to 
Eimco's Complaint nor was it a party to Eimco's contempt 
proceedings t. '---. never sought thereafter to join C-H as an 
indispen. . e proceedings pursuant to Rule : ~f 
the Utah Rules or Civ-j Procedure, nor did Eimco follow Rule 
71B(b) to make C-H bound to the judgments agai r - - -* , • •-. G 
& G Steel Eimco's might-makes-right theory ^: jurisdiction is 
contrary to fundamental due process to whi -zr. C-H -, s «- ntitled. 
This action was commenced by Ei-* 988. 
Trial .^ - Ttober I'.J 8 9 C-H was formed - November of 
1989. Judgment ': r * original complaint was not entered until 
March 1991. The Judgment of Contempt was o^o^ e d in July 1991. 
Eimco 1 lad amp] e t::i me since Novembex -h • t bring a proper 
action against C-H alleging its alter ego illegal transfer 
theories. Instead it went against > _ £ 
execution and garnishment, and by writs of garnishment entered 
by the clerk of the court, wherein Eimco' s counsel falsely 
interlineated in the writ that C-H was a judgment defendant. 
(R. 3272-73, 7115-17, 3283, 3312-15, 3340-41, copies at 
Appendices 13-17 of C-H's initial brief. ) The Judgment of 
Contempt and post-judgment writs are void as to C-H because the 
trial court lacked jurisdiction over C-H and because C-H was not 
afforded due process of law before its property was taken. 
In this reply, C-H refers the Court to the Statement 
of Facts set forth in C-H' s initial brief, and responds as 
follows to the new arguments made by Eimco. 
I. C-H HAS PROPERLY INTERVENED IN THIS APPEAL 
Eimco' s first argument is that C-H should not be 
permitted to intervene in this appeal to challenge the validity 
of the trial court' s orders with respect to C-H's assets. 
(Eimco's Brief at 13-18. ) This "issue" is no issue at all; 
this Court has already granted C-H leave to intervene in this 
appeal. 
On December 3, 1992, C-H filed its Motion to Intervene 
to enable it to brief the Court regarding the legal and factual 
issues affecting C-H' s interests, particularly with regard to 
the jurisdiction of the trial court over the assets of C-H. On 
December 16, 1992, Eimco filed an eight-page memorandum opposing 
C-H' s Motion to Intervene. The following day, the Court entered 
an Order granting C-H' s Motion to Intervene. Eimco' s brief 
repeats the same arguments it made against C-H' s intervention. 
(Compare Eimco' s Brief at pp. 13-18 with Eimco' s Response in 
Opposition to Motion to Intervene. ) Those arguments have been 
considered and rejected by this Court. 
The Utah Supreme Court expressly has stated that 
intervention can be sought for the first time on appeal upon a 
strong showing of entitlement and justification. Jenner v. Real 
Estate Services, 659 P. 2d 1072 (Utah 1983). O H made such a 
showing in its memorandum in support of its Motion to Intervene 
and again in its brief as intervenor. 
II. C-H' S INTERVENTION RIGHTFULLY CHALLENGES THE TRIAL 
COURT' S ORDERS AFFECTING ITS ASSETS 
Eimco further attempts to discourage the Court from 
reaching the merits of the jurisdiction and due process issues 
raised by C-H by arguing that these issues were not properly 
preserved for appeal. Eimco misses the point. Obviously C-H 
did not file a notice of appeal; it was not a party to any of 
the judgments or orders of the trial court. The primary reason 
for C-H intervening on appeal is that it was not a party to 
Eimco' s action before the trial court--and yet its assets were 
seized by Eimco as if it was a judgment defendant. 
C-H is a real party in interest to the Judgment of 
Contempt entered against defendant Callahan. That judgment 
ordered Callahan to transfer all of C-H' s assets to Eimco. C-H 
was not a party to those contempt proceedings, nor was it (or 
Callahan for that matter) given notice or an opportunity to be 
heard on the issue of alter ego. Eimco' s alter ego theory was 
an unpleaded and unproven allegation that Eimco inserted as part 
of the proposed Findings and Judgments two months after the 
trial court' s minute entry on the contempt motion. (See C-H' s 
Brief, pp. 26-28. ) Given Eimco' s backdoor technique, Eimco 
cannot be heard to argue that C-H failed to challenge the 
jurisdiction and legality of the trial court's decisions with 
respect to C-H' s assets. l 
III. RES JUDICATA DOES NOT APPLY 
It is difficult to understand Eimco' s argument that 
the jurisdiction and due process issues that C-H has raised in 
this appeal are res judicata due to the federal court 
proceedings. (Eimco' s Brief at 18. ) The bankruptcy court 
ordered the return of a substantial portion of C-H' s property 
upon determining that it was property belonging to C-H, and not 
Eimco, under 11 U. S. C. § 541. (See C-H's Brief at Appendix 22. ) 
The bankruptcy court further found that C-H is a corporate 
entity entitled to file for relief under the bankruptcy code, 
id. , rejecting Eimco's argument to the bankruptcy court that C-H 
was a sham corporation. If anything, res judicata would apply 
in favor of C-H' s position in this appeal. 
On August 6, 1991, Gerald Callahan, through his 
attorney, George Fadel, objected to the Ex Parte Motion for Writ 
of Execution that Eimco had levied against C-H on that same day. 
Mr. Fadel appeared on behalf of Mr. Callahan, and argued at 
length to the trial court, to no avail, that Eimco' s Writ was 
improper because "C-H is not a party to this action. It is not 
a judgment debtor." (R. 7290-7320, 7292, copy of entire hearing 
transcript attached hereto at Appendix 1. ) Eimco' s plan to 
seize C-H was a surprise to Callahan's counsel: "I had no idea 
that they had in the back of their mind that by inserting the 
alter ego doctrine that they' re going to go down and take C-H 
entirely, which goes right back to the question, that they want 
to eliminate the competition, they don' t want to get paid over a 
period of time. " (R. 7299. ) Thus, the key issue that C-H raises 
as intervenor on appeal was brought to the attention of the 
trial court through Callahan' s counsel as soon as Eimco unveiled 
its strategy. Once the court issued the writ, C-H filed for 
bankruptcy relief to protect the interests of its legitimate 
creditors. The automatic stay was continually in effect until 
C-H intervened in this appeal. 
Eimco also falsely implies that the dismissal of C-H' s 
bankruptcy case was an adjudication on the merits of the issues 
on this appeal. (Eimco7s Brief at 10-11, 18-19.) The 
bankruptcy case was dismissed upon the motion of Eimco that C-H 
had insufficient assets with which to effect a plan of 
reorganization before the deadline that had been set by the 
bankruptcy court. No wonder; Eimco had seized all its operating 
funds. That dismissal had nothing to do with the issues raised 
in this appeal. 
Similarly, the dismissal of C-H' s bankruptcy case has 
had no effect on the adversary proceeding pending before the 
federal district court. In that proceeding, C-H seeks damages 
for Eimco' s seizure of its assets. There is substantial overlap 
in issues in that action and in the jurisdiction and due process 
issues that C-H has raised in this appeal. For that reason, on 
July 16, 1993, C-H filed in the federal court a Motion to Stay 
the federal action, to which Eimco has agreed, pending this 
Court' s determination of the issues raised in this intervention. 
The federal district court' s denial of C-H's motion for a 
preliminary injunction regarding the "fresh writs" that Eimco 
caused to issue in March 4, 1993 hardly constitutes a 
determination on the merits of C-H' s claims. By definition, a 
preliminary injunction is a temporary order pending "trial on 
the merits." (Fed. R. Civ. P. 65.) 
No adjudication on the merits has been made by the 
federal district court or by the bankruptcy court with regard to 
the jurisdiction and legality of the state trial court's orders 
respecting C-H's assets. Res judicata does not apply. C-H is 
anxiously awaiting its day in this Court on the issues that it 
has raised here. 
IV. C-H' S ISSUES ON APPEAL ARE NOT MOOT 
Eimco's argument that the "fresh writs" that it 
obtained on March 4, 1993 rendered all of C-H' s arguments on 
appeal moot also is incomprehensible. (Eimco7 s Brief at 19. ) 
Those writs were issued ex parte by the Clerk of the Third 
District Court based on the same judgments against G & G and 
Callahan in which C-H was not a party and which are at issue on 
this appeal. (See Appendix 24 to C-H' s initial brief. ) If 
those judgments are rendered void and unenforceable as against 
C-H on this appeal then all writs that have been issued pursuant 
to those judgments are also rendered void. (See C-H Brief at 
30, citing 2-H Ranch Co. v. Simmons. 658 P. 2d 68, 72 (Wyo. 
1983), and 30 Am. Jur. 2d § 10 at 451 (1967) (execution on void 
judgment is itself void. ) Eimco has no authority for its novel 
argument that a new writ can somehow cure a defective judgment 
or can magically render moot an appeal of that judgment. If 
that were that the case, then a plaintiff could circumvent 
appellate review of any judgment simply by having new writs of 
execution issued by the clerk of the trial court while the case 
is on appeal. 
Eimco fails to disclose that the trial court did quash 
Eimco's "fresh writs" with regard to Eimco' s incredible attempt 
to seize C-H' s lawsuit against Eimco that is pending before the 
federal court. (See Order dated May 28, 1993, copy attached 
hereto at Appendix 2. ) Eimco is trying to do anything it can to 
prevent C-H from having its day in court to challenge the 
legality of the seizure of C-H' s assets and eliminating it as a 
competitor. 
V. THE TRIAL COURT WAS WITHOUT JURISDICTION OVER C-H 
Eimco argues that the trial court properly allowed 
Eimco to seize C-H's assets because the findings in connection 
with the contempt motion were that C-H was the successor to 
G & G Steel and was the alter ego of Callahan. (Eimco' s Brief 
at 20-21. ) Eimco' s argument begs and avoids the central 
question raised here by C-H, which is whether the contempt 
proceeding was a valid determination of C-H' s relationship to 
G & G Steel and Gerald Callahan. 2 
As set forth in C-H' s initial brief at pages 18-28, 
the Judgment of Contempt against defendant Gerald Callahan, 
wherein C-H' s assets were ordered transferred to Eimco, is void 
as against C-H. Defendant Gerald Callahan, and non-parties lone 
Eimco' s argument is also flawed because the order 
transferring G & G's assets to Eimco to be valued and applied to 
the final judgment was not made until July 2, 1991 (R. 3192-96), 
19 months after C-H had been in business and three months after 
the March 29, 1991 hearing on the contempt motion. That order 
was the result of a stipulation between counsel for Eimco and 
counsel for defendant Glen Hansen, Richard F. Bojanowski (R. 
3144-48). Defendant Hansen had settled out with Eimco over a 
year earlier on March 26, 1990. (R. 2263-68.) Neither Gerald 
Callahan, his attorney George Fadel, nor C-H was privy to that 
stipulation. This chronology illustrates the fallacy of Eimco' s 
argument that C-H was the successor to G & G. Why would Eimco 
seek an order in July 1991 to obtain G & G assets if C-H was 
merely the successor of G & G's business as of November 1989? 
The answer is that C-H was a separate and valid legal entity 
that Eimco should have sued separately on its claim that it was 
the alter ego of Callahan or that its assets had been 
fraudulently transferred from G & G. 
Callahan, Lena Bloomquist and David Von Mendenhall, were the 
subjects of Eimco's Motion for Judgment of Contempt. (See 2504-
2505, R. 2388-2389, copies at Appendices 7 and 30, respectively, 
to C-H's initial brief. ) Eimco never named C-H as a party to 
its contempt motion nor did Eimco serve C-H with notice 
regarding the unpleaded allegation that C-H was an alter ego 
corporation of Gerald Callahan. (See Certificate of Service 
dated May 18, 1990, R. 2408-2409, copy at Appendix 8 to C-H's 
initial brief. ) C-H should have been joined as a necessary and 
indispensable party to that proceeding which resulted in the 
elimination of all its assets. 
The trial court did not hold lone Callahan, Lena 
Bloomquist, or David Von Mendenhall in contempt, nor did the 
court rule that C-H was Gerald Callahan' s alter ego. Eimco 
surreptitiously added that to the court' s ruling in the proposed 
findings submitted two months later. (Compare minute entry 
dated April 17, 1991, R. 2976, with Findings dated July 9, 1991, 
R. 3151-3155. ) Again, C-H was never served with a copy of the 
proposed Findings and Conclusions or the Judgment, either before 
or after they were executed, contrary to the requirement of Rule 
58A(d), Utah R. Civ. P. (See Notice of Entry of Judgment of 
Contempt, July 10, 1991, R. 3217-3218.) No factual findings 
were made in support of the conclusion that C-H is the alter ego 
of Callahan. The purported finding was in fact an unsupported 
conclusion. 
Eimco argues that C-H submitted itself to the 
jurisdiction of the trial court by appearing as a garnishee 
pursuant to writs of garnishment that had been issued to 
defendant Gerald Callahan, and by arguing against writs of 
execution on August 6, 1991 and again on May 28, 1993. (Eimco7 s 
Brief at 22-23.) Eimco misunderstands C-H's jurisdiction 
argument. C-H does not argue that it does not have sufficient 
contacts with the State of Utah such that it could be made 
subject to the jurisdiction of a Utah court. C-H's argument is 
that Eimco never filed an action against C-H--be it a complaint, 
motion or otherwise—setting forth in writing Eimco' s 
allegations that C-H was the alter ego of Callahan or that it 
was doing business in violation of the court' s Temporary 
Restraining Order of November 15, 1990. (R. 2220-2223.) The 
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure plainly set forth how a court 
obtains jurisdiction over a person or entity: they can be named 
as a party to a complaint as provided by Rule 3(b); they can 
later be joined as a party pursuant to Rule 19; or finally they 
can be bound by the judgment of another in accordance with the 
procedure set forth in Rule 71B--which Eimco had tried and 
failed as to lone Callahan. (R. 2599. ) 
VI. EIMCO' S ACTIONS AGAINST C-H WERE NOT CONSISTENT WITH 
DUE PROCESS OR FUNDAMENTAL FAIRNESS 
Eimco' s theory of jurisdiction and due process is that 
since C-H appeared in court as a garnishee and since its 
"elected" attorney George Fadel appeared in court in connection 
with his representation of another person, the trial court had 
jurisdiction over C-H for all purposes and could enter orders 
authorizing the seizure of all of its assets. (Eimco' s Brief at 
24-25.) That is jurisdiction by ambush. Eimco has no authority 
for its claim that jurisdiction can be exercised over a party in 
this manner. All the rules relating to a court' s exercise of 
jurisdiction over a person or entity, such as Rules 3, 19, and 
7IB, require written notice with an opportunity to be heard 
before adverse action is taken with respect to that person. 
Eimco ignored these rules in the court below and in its brief 
here. The provisions of Rule 69 relating to execution on 
judgments apply only to property of the judgment debtor. Rule 
6 9 cannot be construed to violate the due process protections 
set forth elsewhere in the rules. Due process requires written 
notice and a fair hearing before adverse action is taken with 
respect one' s property, not after the fact. Mullane v. Central 
Hanover Bank & Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 313-15, 70 S. Ct. 652, 
657 (1950); Federal Pet). Ins. Corp. v. Duerksen, 810 P. 2d 1308 
(Okla. App. 1991); Prickett v. Moore, 684 P. 2d 1191, 1193 (Okla. 
1984). 
Eimco argues that C-H had sufficient notice because 
its attorney as of April 1991 was George Fadel, who was also 
Gerald Callahan' s counsel. (Eimco' s Brief at 24-25. ) Eimco 
provided no authority in support of this novel argument. At all 
times in these proceedings, Mr. Fadel appeared solely in the 
capacity as counsel for G & G Steel and Gerald Callahan--not for 
C-H. Any pleadings or notices Eimco sent to Mr. Fadel were in 
his capacity as counsel for G & G and Callahan. There is 
nothing in the record indicating that Eimco served C-H with 
notice of its plans to hold it liable for the judgments against 
G & G and Gerald Callahan, or that it served Mr. Fadel with such 
notice in the capacity as counsel for C-H. 
Eimco also argues that C-H had actual notice, via the 
notice given to certain employees and principals of C-H, and 
that this actual notice is all that is required for due process 
to be satisfied. (Eimco' s Brief at 25-27. ) Eimco' s argument is 
neither factually nor legally correct. 
It is true that lone Callahan, president of C-H, and 
Gerald Callahan, Lena Bloomquist, and David Von Mendenhall, all 
employees of C-H, received the notice of Eimco' s Renewed Motion 
for Judgment of Contempt and were served with an Order to Show 
Cause in that regard. (R. 2304-2305.) However, those documents 
claimed that these individuals had violated the Temporary 
Restraining Order dated November 15, 1990 (R. 2220-2223) by 
their participation in the business of C-H. (R. 2388-2396.) 
These documents did not indicate that Eimco planned to seize 
C-H' s assets in satisfaction of its judgments against G & G, 
Callahan, and Hansen. (See C-H Brief at 10-12.) Furthermore, 
no factual allegations relating to alter ego were made by Eimco 
in the contempt motion, its supporting memorandum, or in the 
Order to Show Cause. (See Appendices 2 9, 30 and 7 to C-H' s 
initial brief. ) Thus, not even the individuals who were the 
subjects of Eimco's contempt motion were put on notice that 
Eimco was alleging that C-H was the alter ego of Gerald 
Callahan, let alone C-H itself. Eimco did not unveil its alter 
ego theory nor disclose its plan to seize C-H' s assets until it 
submitted its proposed Findings and Judgment on the Contempt 
motion on June 13, 1991, which were served on Mr. Fadel only, 
not to C-H or to any of its officers or directors. 
Similarly, the notice that C-H was given as a 
garnishee of Gerald Callahan' s wages (see writs of garnishment 
dated April 18, 1991, R. 3024, and July 8, 1991, R. 3227) 
certainly did not advise C-H that its assets were sought by 
Eimco. On the contrary, the garnishment proceedings only sought 
to attach Gerald Callahan's wages. 
Even if C-H had actual notice of Eimco's claims 
against its assets before they were seized, that notice would be 
legally insufficient under the rules of procedure or the due 
process clause. In this regard, the U. S. Supreme Court cases 
cited by Eimco on page 25 of its brief do not hold that written 
notice is unnecessary if actual notice is given. Rather, they 
hold that written notice must be given in a manner calculated to 
give actual notice.3 The written notice requirement is not a 
mere technicality. It enables a party to know the precise 
factual and legal basis of a claim to its property to enable 
that party to defend itself before any action is taken with 
respect to that property. Mullane v. Central Hanover Bank & 
Trust Co. , 339 U.S. 306, 314-15, 70 S. Ct. 652, 657 (1950). 
Eimco ignored the controlling Utah Supreme case Monroe 
Citv v. Arnold. 22 Utah 2d 291, 452 P. 2d 321 (Utah 1969), 
discussed on pages 28-29 of C-H' s initial brief. That case held 
that actual notice was insufficient for a party to be subject to 
a plaintiff s claims; service of a summons and complaint or 
other such process is required. 
VII. C-H IS NOT CALLAHAN' S ALTER EGO 
Notwithstanding the trial court's lack of jurisdiction 
over C-H, and the lack of due process with regard to C-H' s 
interests, the Judgment of Contempt is clearly erroneous on its 
merits because the court' s finding of alter ego was not 
supported by the law or by the evidence. Eimco' s argument that 
"the courts are not hindered by *corporateness' " (Eimco's Brief 
at 28-31) is not the law in Utah. 
"Ordinarily, a corporation is regarded as a separate 
and distinct legal entity from its stockholders. " Dockstader v. 
Walker, 29 Utah 2d 370, 510 P. 2d 526, 528 (1973). A corporation 
is not obligated to pay for the personal debts of a stockholder 
or employee, nor is an employee personally liable for the debts 
of the corporation. See Salt Lake City Corp. v. James Constr. , 
761 P. 2d 42, 46 (Utah App. 1988). An exception to this rule is 
if, on proper adjudication, the corporate entity is disregarded 
and is found to be the alter ego of the employee. Two elements 
are necessary to establish alter ego under controlling Utah law: 
(1) unity of interest and ownership between the individual and 
the corporation; and (2) observance of the corporate form would 
sanction a fraud, promote injustice, or an inequitable result 
would follow. Messick v. PHD Trucking Service, Inc. , 678 P. 2d 
791, 794 (Utah 1984); Norman v. Murray First Thrift & Loan Co. . 
596 P. 2d 1028, 1030 (Utah 1979). Courts "will only reluctantly 
and cautiously pierce the corporate veil. " Salt Lake City 
Corp. , 761 P. 2d at 46. 
The first element to an alter ego claim is indeed 
referred to as the "formalities requirement," and it is 
established by showing that the corporation failed to observe 
the statutory requirements of a corporation, including record 
keeping, shareholders' meetings, adequate capitalization, stock 
issuance, etc. Messick, 678 P. 2d at 794. Eimco attempts to 
argue that this first element need not be established if the 
second element is met. (Eimco' s Brief at 30, n. 19. ) The Utah 
Supreme Court in Messick and Norman held otherwise. The 
elements are stated conjunctively, not disjunctively. Eimco 
makes this argument because it cannot dispute that it failed to 
introduce any evidence in the trial court that Gerald Callahan 
had any ownership interest in C-H, that C-H commingled its 
assets with Callahan' s assets, or that it neglected to observe 
any statutory requirements or corporate formalities. (See 
Transcript of March 29, 1991 hearing on Eimco's contempt motion, 
R. 3712-3845.) Absent evidence and specific findings as to the 
corporate formalities element of the alter ego determination, 
the Judgment of Contempt which ordered Callahan to transfer all 
assets of C-H to Eimco is clearly erroneous and must be 
reversed. This is the same situation that the Utah Supreme 
Court faced in Messick: 
The record before us is devoid of proof to justify the 
trial court' s ruling that the corporate entity should 
be disregarded. No evidence was adduced to establish 
the corporation' s neglect of statutory formalities nor 
was any evidence received to the effect that 
observance of the corporate entity would "sanction a 
fraud, promote injustice, or [produce] an inequitable 
result. " We therefore reverse the ruling. . . . " 
Messick at 794-95. 
As to the second prong of the alter ego determination, 
a review of the evidence demonstrates that the court' s findings 
that the business of C-H violated the November 15, 1989 
Temporary Restraining Order also was clearly erroneous. Eimco' s 
sense of "justice" (Eimco's Brief at 31) distorts what the court 
told Callahan he was permitted and not permitted to do. 
The November 15, 1989 Temporary Restraining Order did not forbid 
Callahan or anyone else from competing with Eimco, as long a 
Eimco's detailed drawings were not used. (R* 2220-2223). 
C-H was formed consistent with the court' s bench 
ruling of November 7, 1989, shortly after the trial, that the 
defendants could continue in the same business and in 
competition with Eimco upon the condition that Eimco' s detailed 
drawings could not used by that business: The court stated: 
I wanted to make clear -- the Court is not indicating 
that Callahan and Hansen and G & G Steel Corporation 
is not entitled to compete with Plaintiff. They have 
every right to do so. However, in competing with 
Eimco, they cannot use EIMCO' s detailed drawings 
obtained from any one of the -- other than vendors or 
customers of EIMCO. 
* * * 
So, therefore, I didn' t preclude your clients 
from continuing business. I'm just saying, "Do it 
fairly without the use of their drawings. And you can 
go ahead and compete with them tomorrow. 
(R. 5650-5651, 5673, copy at Appendices 2 and 3 of C-H' s initial 
brief.) Because of the restraining Order that was also issued 
freezing the operations of G & G Steel, it was necessary for a 
new corporation to be formed in order to continue in business as 
the court permitted and also to not violate the restraining 
order. Callahan' s attorney, in the following colloquy, 
specifically cleared this approach with the court in order that 
both of the court' s rulings could be honored: 
MR. FADEL: So, we'd have to start the business 
over. Your Honor said we should erase it. We have to 
get another corporation and start over. 
THE COURT: That's, as I said --
MR. FADEL: And that's easy enough to do. 
THE COURT: That's exactly what could happen 
here, so that doesn' t --
MR. FADEL: It's easy enough to do, just so --
the next time we'll have the customer make his own 
drawings. If he has a detailed drawing, and we know a 
lot of them do, we will let the customer make the 
drawing for him. 
THE COURT: That's fine. As I said, you can do -
- you can do that. I' m not saying you can' t. 
(R. 5697-5698, copy at Appendix 4 of C-H' s initial, brief. ) 
At the hearing on Eimco' s contempt motion, the court 
refused to recognize its prior ruling that explicitly permitted 
the formation of a new company which could compete with Eimco, 
as long as Eimco' s detailed drawings weren' t used. Callahan 
introduced uncontroverted evidence at the contempt hearing from 
five separate witness, all C-H employees, that C-H never used 
Eimco detailed drawings, nor did it use drawings from G & G 
Steel. (See testimony of lone Callahan, Gerald Callahan, Gary 
Poulson, Joe L. Wood, and Randy Bloomquist, R. 3749-3751, 3782-
3789, 3810-3818.) Eimco's counsel objected to the relevancy of 
this evidence, stating: 
MR. ROSSA: I never alleged that C-H Industries 
at this point-- we have not alleged that C-H 
Industries has used any G & G or C-H drawings--excuse 
me—or Eimco drawings. I have not said that. I 
didn' t ask any questions pertaining to that. In the 
motion papers brought to the court we don' t allege 
that. 
Mr. FADEL: Well, in that event I don' t have to 
pursue it any further. 
(R. 3 784.) The court did not strike the testimony of the C-H 
employees in that regard, but stated "It is not relevant, but 
I'm going to leave it." (R. 3818. ) 
Due to the court' s prior order construed to permit C-H 
to be formed, and the uncontroverted evidence that its operation 
was in compliance with the condition that it not use Eimco 
detailed drawings, the court' s determination eighteen months 
later that C-H was formed to evade the court' s orders is not 
supported by the evidence, is clearly erroneous, and should be 
reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Based on the foregoing, this Court should vacate the 
July 9, 1991 Judgment of Contempt with prejudice as it pertains 
to C-H and its assets, and all writs issued against C-H pursuant 
to that Judgment should also be vacated. 
DATED September 1, 1993. 
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P R 
COURT: 
DO YOU WANT 
RECORD? 
MR. ROSSA: 
UTAH; TUESDAY, 
O C E E D I N G 
ENVIROTECH VS. 
AUGUST 6, 1991 
S 
G&G STEEL, 
TO MAKE YOUR APPEARANCES FOR THE 
THOMAS J. ROSSA 
AND DAVID T. BERRY FOR THE PLAINTIFF 
MR. FADEL: 
GERALD CALLAHAN. 
THE 
IS AS A RESUL1 
EXECUTION, ANE 
OBJECTIONS, SC 
HAVE 
MR. FADEL? 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
' OF THE 
GEORGE K. FADEL 
AND THE PURPOSE 
EX PARTE MOTION 
1 I CONTACTED MR. FADEL 
I I SET 
, JEFFERY ALDOUS 
ENVIROTECH. 
APPEARING FOR 
OF THIS HEARING 
FOR WRIT OF 
AND HE SAID HE HAD 
IT TODAY AT A TIME FOR HEARING. 
I YOU HAD ENOUGH TIME TO 
FADEL: 
COURT: 
FADEL: 
17TH ENTERED A MINUTE 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
FADEL: 
YES, YOUR HONOR 
FINE. YOU MAY 
YOUR HONOR, THE 
ENTRY IN WHICH 
OR TO AMEND THE 
RIGHT. 
GO OVER IT, 
• 1 
PROCEED. 
COURT ON APRIL 
YOU DENIED THE 
FINDINGS. 
IN THAT SAME MINUTE ENTRY THE 
COURT INDICATED CALLAHAN WAS IN CONTEMPT AND SHOULD PAY 
$5,000. 
THE COURT: RIGHT. 
MR. FADEL: ACCORDING TO THE RULES, MR. ROSSA 
SHOULD HAVE SUBMITTED TO THE COURT A FORMAL FINDINGS 
AND ORDER WITHIN 15 DAYS. HAD HE DONE SO, THE ORDER 
WOULD HAVE BEEN ENTERED FORMALLY IN TIME FOR US TO TAKE 
THE APPEAL BROUGHT PROM THE FINAL.JUDGEMENT AND FROM 
THE JUDGEMENT OF CONTEMPT. BUT IT WAS DELAYED, AND 
THIS OTHER FORMAL FINDINGS WEREN'T PRESENTED TO THE 
COURT FOR SIGNATURE UNTIL JULY 9TH. 
NOW, I ASSUME THAT THERE WAS A REASON FOR 
THAT. THEY WANTED TO PROCEED WITH THIS IN SUCH A WAY 
THAT WOULDN'T BE AFFECTED BY THE APPEAL. 
NOW, COMING TO THE MERITS APART FROM THAT, 
YOUR HONOR, THEY'RE ASKING THE COURT HERE NOW TO 
AUTHORIZE A WRIT OF EXECUTION ON ALL THE ASSETS OF 
C-H. C-H IS NOT A PARTY TO THIS ACTION. IT IS NOT A 
JUDGEMENT DEBTOR. THE COURT COULD AUTHORIZE THE 
EXECUTION OF ANY ASSETS OF CALLAHAN. IN FACT IF 
CALLAHAN HAD ANY ASSETS IN C-H AND THE COURT HAS IN 
FACT ALLOWED THE GARNISHMENT OF CALLAHAN'S RECEIVABLES 
FROM C-H, AND EVEN TO THE EXTENT OF SAYING THAT WHEN HE 
ADVANCED THE--
THE COURT: CREDIT CARD. 
MR. FADEL: -- ADVANCED THE EXPENSES ON THE 
CREDIT CARD HE HAD TO REIMBURSE— C-H HAD TO REIMBURSE 
2 
1 EIMCO $6400, PRACTICALLY ALL OF THEIR CASH FLOW. 
2 NOW, CALLAHAN IS INDEBTED TO C-H FOR THAT 
3 AMOUNT OF MONEY; CALLAHAN IS NO LONGER EMPLOYED BY C-H, 
4 AND SO HE IS A DEBTOR TO C-H. 
5 NOW, COMING TO THE PARTIES, THE COURT DID NOT 
6 IN ITS MINUTE .ENTRY FIND. THAT CALLAHAN.WAS THE ALTER 
7 EGO OF C-H, OR VICE VERSA. IN THE EVIDENCE, THE 
8 EVIDENCE WAS THAT THE INVESTORS IN C-H INITIALLY WERE 
9 MRS. HANSEN AND MRS. CALLAHAN IN G & G PRODUCTS. THE 
10 NAME WAS CHANGED LATER. THEY EACH OWNED AN EQUAL 
11 $1,000 WORTH OF SHARES. THEREAFTER, THE HANSEN'S 
12 SOUGHT TO WITHDRAW. SO THEN IT BECAME THE SOLE STOCK 
13 OF MRS. CALLAHAN. THEREAFTER, THE SON-IN-LAW OF 
14 CALLAHAN CAME FROM CALIFORNIA, LEFT HIS JOB THERE TO 
15 COME UP AND MANAGE THIS, AND HE AND HIS WIFE INVESTED 
16 IN STOCK AND LOANED $6,000. AND ANOTHER DAUGHTER HAS 
17 INVESTED. 
18 NOW, NONE OF THE MONEY WAS INVESTED BY GERALD 
19 CALLAHAN. MR. ROSSA FREQUENTLY POINTS TO THE FACT THAT 
20 BECAUSE IONE CALLAHAN HAS INVESTED AND IS NOW A 
21 FULL-TIME EMPLOYEE THAT SOMEHOW THAT IS CALLAHAN AND 
2 2 NOT MRS. CALLAHAN. 
23 I WOULD LIKE TO PASS TO THE COURT AS A 
24 REFRESHER THE PROPERTY RIGHTS OF WOMEN. 
25 THE COURT: I DON'T HAVE ANY QUESTION ABOUT 
1 THAT. SHE CAN OWN IT OUTRIGHT. 
2 MR. FADEL: AND ON THE SECOND PAGE THERE, 
3 PARTICULARLY CONVEYANCE TRANSFER OR LOAN EXECUTED BY 
4 HUSBAND OR WIFE TO OR IN FAVOR OF THE OTHER SHALL BE 
5 VALID TO SAME STANDARD BETWEEN OTHER PERSONS. SO I 
6 .1. .DON'T-THINK WE ..SHOULD.BE REGARDING LONE -AS BEING A PART 
7 OF GERALD CALLAHAN. 
8 AFTER ALL WHEN A MAN HAS A MILLION DOLLAR 
9 JUDGEMENT AGAINST HIM, HE DOESN'T HAVE AN EASY TIME 
10 FINDING A JOB ANYWHERE, OR ANYBODY ELSE THAT WOULD PUT 
11 UP THE MONEY IN ANY COMPANY. AND THE OTHERS WOULD HAVE 
12 TO TAKE THE RISK. IN VIEW OF THIS HARASSMENT, IT'S 
13 EVEN DIFFICULT FOR A FAMILY TO DO THAT. 
14 NOW, YOUR HONOR, IN THE FINDINGS THAT WERE 
15 PREPARED BY THEM, THEY INDICATED THAT IONE WAS A SOLE 
16 STOCKHOLDER AND THERE WAS NOTHING IN THE FINDINGS THAT 
17 SHOW THAT CALLAHAN, DURING MOST OF THE TIME-- HE 
18 INITIALLY WAS A DIRECTOR AND THEN HE RESIGNED. THE 
19 REST OF THE TIME HE WAS AN EMPLOYEE. THERE WERE OTHER 
20 OFFICERS. THEY HAD OTHER EMPLOYEES, ALL OF THEM 
21 DEPENDING ON THIS AS THEIR LIVELIHOOD, AND THEY HAVE 
22 DOWN THERE NOW MRS. CALLAHAN WORKING FULL-TIME, JOSEPH 
23 WORKING AS A GENERAL MANAGER, LENNA WHO HAD PREVIOUSLY 
24 WORKED FOR THEM THERE, AND THEY HAD THREE OTHER 
25 EMPLOYEES ALL DEPENDENT ON THIS. 
1 CALLAHAN'S ONLY INVOLVEMENT IS THAT OF 
2 SALESMAN AND MAKING MEASUREMENTS. ALL THE DRAWINGS AND 
3 THE MANUFACTURING AND THE BILLING, EVERYTHING ELSE IS 
4 DONE BY OTHER PEOPLE. 
5 NOW, WHEN IT COMES TO THE ALTER EGO CONCEPT, 
6 THERE HAVE BEEN A FEW UTAH CASES THAT HAVE DEALT WITH 
7 THAT AND THERE ARE SOME SIGNIFICANT STATEMENTS HERE IN 
8 ONE OF THE MORE RECENT ONES THAT IS REPORTED AT 718 
9 P. 2D 1102, THE COURT OF APPEALS CASE IN HANSEN VS. 
10 GREEN RIVER GROUP. AND ON ALTER EGO THEY SAY THAT THE 
11 UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT HAS ADOPTED A TWO-PART TEST 
12 FOR DETERMINING WHEN TO DISREGARD A CORPORATE ENTITY. 
13 THERE MUST BE A CONCURRENCE OF TWO CIRCUMSTANCES. 
14 THERE MUST BE SUCH A UNITY OF INTEREST AND OWNERSHIP 
15 THAT THE SEPARATE PERSONALITIES OF THE CORPORATION AND 
16 THE INDIVIDUALS NO LONGER EXIST. 
17 IN THIS CASE THERE'S NO OWNERSHIP BY 
18 CALLAHAN. 
19 SECOND, THE OBSERVANCE OF THE CORPORATE FORUM 
20 WOULD SANCTION A FRAUD, PROMOTE INJUSTICE OR AN 
21 INEQUITABLE RESULT WOULD FOLLOW. 
22 NOW, IF THE COURT WILL RECALL, THE COURT SAYS 
23 THERE'S NOTHING WRONG WITH HIS STARTING A NEW BUSINESS 
24 AS LONG AS HE DOESN'T USE EIMCO DRAWINGS. AND WHEN WE 
25 HAD A HEARING HERE WE HAD TWO PEOPLE HERE FROM THE 
ORGANIZATION C-H THAT SAID THAT THOSE DRAWINGS WERE 
BEING MADE BY COMPUTER, BY TWO PERSONS WHO HAD NO 
ASSOCIATION WITH CALLAHAN WITH RESPECT TO MAKING THOSE 
AND THEY COULD MAKE THEM ON THEIR OWN FROM THE 
MEASUREMENTS THAT I GAVE THEM. HE DIDN'T MAKE THE 
DRAWINGS. 
THE COURT GOES ON FURTHER TO SAY THAT THERE 
ARE-- THESE TESTS TO DETERMINE THE UNITY OF INTEREST, 
ONE UNDER CAPITALIZATION OF A ONE-MAN CORPORATION. 
WELL, THIS IS NOT A ONE-MAN CORPORATION, NOT EVEN A 
ONE-WOMAN CORPORATION. 
TWO, FAILURE TO OBSERVE CORPORATE 
FORMALITIES; THREE, NONPAYMENT OF DIVIDENDS; FOUR, 
SIPHONING CORPORATE FUNDS BY THE DOMINANT STOCKHOLDER. 
NOW, THERE WAS NO EVIDENCE THAT HE WAS TAKING 
ANYTHING OTHER THAN A THOUSAND DOLLARS A MONTH BECAUSE 
THOSE OTHER PEOPLE HAD TO LIVE AND THIS WAS ALL THE 
CASH FLOW THERE WAS. HE WASN'T TAKING IT. 
USE OF THE CORPORATION AS A FACADE FOR 
OPERATIONS OF DOMINANT STOCKHOLDER OR STOCKHOLDERS. 
THIS IS NOT A FACADE. THIS IS A CORPORATION DOING 
BUSINESS. 
AND THE USE OF A CORPORATE ENTITY TO PROMOTE 
INJUSTICE OR A FRAUD. 
WHEN YOU'RE USING THIS CORPORATION TO CONDUCT 
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1 BUSINESS IN COMPETITION AND NOT FRAUDULENTLY USING 
2 ANYBODY ELSE'S DRAWINGS AND MATERIALS, I CAN'T SEE HOW 
3 THAT INVOLVES INJUSTICE OR A FRAUD. 
4 THERE ARE OTHER CASES THAT GO THAT SAME 
5 ROUTE. AND ALSO UNDER AM JUR THEY GIVE A CHECK LIST OF 
6 . FACTS AND CLRCUMS-TANCES TENDING TO. SHOW THAT THE 
7 CORPORATE PRESIDENT IS THE ALTER EGO OF THE 
8 CORPORATION. 
9 NOW, HE'S NOT EVEN THE PRESIDENT. PRESIDENTS 
10 GOVERN ALL THE CORPORATE AFFAIRS. PRESIDENT'S 
11 ASSUMPTION OF PERSONAL LIABILITY AND OBLIGATION, 
12 INCOMPLETE ORGANIZATION OF CORPORATION; PRESIDENT'S 
13 POWER TO REMOVE ANY OFFICER OR DIRECTOR. THE 
14 DIRECTOR'S FAILURE TO MEET REGULARLY, DIRECTOR'S 
15 FAILURE TO MAINTAIN MINUTES. PRESIDENT'S OWNERSHIP OF 
16 MAJORITY OF THE CORPORATE STOCK, LACK OF PAID IN 
17 CAPITAL. AND THEY HAVE OTHER TESTS, NONE OF WHICH 
18 APPLY IN THIS CASE. 
19 BUT IF WE JUST TAKE THE FINDINGS OF THE 
20 COURT, THERE AREN'T ANY FINDINGS THAT WOULD SUPPORT 
21 THAT C-H WAS THE ALTER EGO OF CALLAHAN. AND NONE OF 
22 THOSE REQUISITE FINDINGS. THERE WAS THE CONCLUSION 
2 3 THAT HE WAS THE ALTER EGO. 
24 IT'S POSSIBLE THAT THE COURT HAD IN MIND THAT 
25 CALLAHAN WAS IN CONTEMPT BECAUSE HE MAY HAVE DONE 
1 SOMETHING THROUGH C-H THAT HE SHOULDN'T HAVE DONE 
2 ALONE, AND WE ALREADY ARGUED THAT BEFORE THE COURT. 
3 THIS QUESTION OF WHETHER TAKING THE ORDERS THAT G & G 
4 COULDN'T FILL ANYWAY AND HAVEN'T YET TRIED TO FILL AND 
5 NOBODY ELSE TRIED TO SATISFY THOSE CUSTOMERS, AND 
6 THAT'S WHAT HE .DID AND I ASSUME THAT .THE COURT FOUND 
7 THAT HE SHOULDN'T HAVE DONE THAT. AND WHILE I CAN'T 
8 UNDERSTAND IT, I CAN'T ARGUE THAT ANY MORE. 
9 THE COURT: WELL, HE WAS JUST DOING WHAT I 
10 DIDN'T WANT HIM TO DO, BY HEARING THE CASE. AS I SAID 
11 BEFORE, HE WAS CIRCUMVENTING THE ORDER ENTERED BY THE 
12 COURT. 
13 MR. FADEL: WELL, WE--
14 THE COURT: SO THAT'S BEEN RULED UPON. 
15 MR. FADEL: YES. 
16 THE COURT: SO WE DON'T EVEN NEED TO 
17 ELABORATE. 
18 MR. FADEL: WHEN WE LOOKED AT THE RESTRAINING 
19 ORDER ITSELF THERE WAS NOTHING IN THERE THAT YOU COULD 
20 SAY THAT HE WASN'T SUPPOSED TO GO OUT AND CONTACT 
21 CUSTOMERS THAT G & G HAD. AS A MATTER OF FACT, IT SAYS 
22 6 & G WON'T SELL OR TRANSFER OR SHIP ANYTHING. SO 
2 3 SOMEBODY HAD TO DO IT. 
24 NOW, COMING TO THIS PROCEEDING HERE TODAY, 
25 YOUR HONOR, THEY'RE ASKING FOR A WRIT TO TAKE ALL OF 
1 THE ASSETS OF C-H. WELL, MOST OF THOSE ASSETS HAVE 
2 BEEN CREATED OVER A PERIOD OF TIME FOLLOWING THE 
3 EMPLOYMENT OF THESE OTHER PERSONS WHO HAVE BEEN 
4 INVOLVED. AND NONE OF THOSE ASSETS ARE CALLAHAN'S. 
5 SO, FIRST OF ALL, THEY'RE NOT A PARTY HERE. 
6 THE WAY THE. ORDER READS—. AND IT'S UNFORTUNATE THAT 
7 THERE WAS ANY MENTION OF AN ALTER EGO ORDER. THE WAY 
8 THE ORDER SAYS, IT SAYS TO PURGE HIMSELF OF CONTEMPT HE 
9 WILL CAUSE THE ASSETS TO BE TRANSFERRED. NOW, HE CAN'T 
10 CAUSE THE ASSETS TO BE TRANSFERRED BECAUSE HE DOESN'T 
11 HAVE THE AUTHORITY OR THE OWNERSHIP. AND ASSUMING THAT 
12 HE DIDN'T, THE WAY THAT I THOUGHT THE COURT HAD 
13 INTERPRETED IT IN OUR DISCUSSION IN CHAMBERS WAS THAT 
14 THE $5,000 WAS THE PENALTY. I HAD NO IDEA THAT THEY 
15 HAD IN THE BACK OF THEIR MIND THAT BY INSERTING THE 
16 ALTER EGO DOCTRINE THAT THEY'RE GOING TO GO DOWN AND 
17 TAKE C-H ENTIRELY, WHICH GOES RIGHT BACK TO THE 
18 QUESTION, THAT THEY WANT TO ELIMINATE THE COMPETITION, 
19 THEY DON'T WANT TO GET PAID OVER A PERIOD OF TIME. 
2 0 AND THAT MAY BE THE SUBJECT OF OTHER 
21 LITIGATION, BUT THAT SHOULDN'T BE NECESSARY. WE SHOULD 
22 BE ABLE TO GET JUSTICE RIGHT HERE WITH RESPECT TO THESE 
23 ITEMS. AND I HOPED THAT THE COURT HAD NOTHING ELSE IN 
24 MIND OTHER THAN THE $5,000 JUDGEMENT WHEN HE ENTERED 
25 THE MINUTE ENTRY. 
NOW, THE WRIT, THE WAY IT IS WORDED, CALLS 
FOR ALL OF THEIR ASSETS; DOESN'T TALK ABOUT 
LIABILITIES. AS A MATTER OF FACT, THERE MAY BE NO 
ASSETS AT ALL TO FULFILL THE OBLIGATION AND WARRANTY 
AND SO FORTH. THERE COULD BE ACTUALLY A DEFICIT. AND 
.THEY SAY.. THEY. WANT TO TURN THEM OVER TO EIMCO- AND TO 
EVALUATE AND DETERMINE HOW MUCH TO APPLY. ALL OF THIS 
IS ENTIRELY IRREGULAR. THE WRIT OF EXECUTION UNDER THE 
CODE, THE RULE SAYS THAT IF HE DOES LEVY ON PROPERTY IT 
HAS TO BE SOLD AT PUBLIC SALE AND TO SELL THEM ITEM BY 
ITEM; HAS TO BE A TERMINATION OF OWNERSHIP, PEOPLE WHO 
CAN CLAIM AND WHAT INTEREST THEREOF. 
IT SEEMS TO ME WE SHOULDN'T HAVE TO ARGUE 
SOMETHING LIKE THIS ON A WRIT OF EXECUTION, THAT THIS 
SHOULD NEVER HAVE BEEN ENTERTAINED IN THE FIRST PLACE. 
WE HAVE BEFORE THE SUPREME COURT ON A MOTION WITH 
RESPECT TO THIS, BUT IT SHOULDN'T BE NECESSARY FOR THEM 
TO HAVE TO ACT. AND UNDER THESE CIRCUMSTANCES, IF THE 
COURT PLEASE, I THINK THAT THERE SHOULD BE A STOP TO 
THIS, THAT THERE SHOULD BE A DETERMINATION THEY FOLLOW 
AS THE ASSETS OF CALLAHAN, AND NOT DISREGARD THE 
INVESTMENTS OF OTHER PEOPLE AND THE ASSETS OF THAT 
INDEPENDENT CORPORATION. 
THE COURT: MR. ROSSA. 
MR. ROSSA: IF I MAY, YOUR HONOR, THE ISSUE 
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1 WITH RESPECT TO THE DOCUMENTS BEFORE YOU IS WHETHER OR 
2 NOT A STAY HAS BEEN IMPOSED BY THE COURT IN ANY 
3 APPROPRIATE LEGAL MANNER. NONE HAS. 
4 THE COURT: THERE'S NO STAY. 
5 MR. ROSSA: THERE'S NO STAY. NOW, THE MOTION 
6 THAT IS BEING-REFERENCED IN THE SUPREME COURT IS A 
7 REQUEST FOR A STAY OF THE SUPREME COURT, BUT THERE IS 
8 NO NOTICE OF APPEAL SO THE SUPREME COURT DOESN'T HAVE 
9 JURISDICTION OF THAT. BUT THAT'S AN ISSUE TO BE 
10 RESOLVED ON MONDAY. 
11 AS OF TODAY-- AS OF THE DAY-- WE PRESENTED 
12 THAT TO YOU YESTERDAY-- THERE IS NO STAY STAYING THE 
13 JUDGEMENT OF CONTEMPT. THAT IS A FINAL JUDGEMENT. THE 
14 ARGUMENT THAT I HAVE BEEN LISTENING TO AND THE COURT 
15 HAS BEEN HEARING FOR THE LAST 20 MINUTES HAS BEEN 
16 BASICALLY A REHASH OF EVERYTHING THAT HAS BEEN ARGUED 
17 OVER THE LAST FOUR, FIVE, SIX MONTHS. 
18 MR. FADEL OBVIOUSLY DISAGREES WITH THE 
19 CONCLUSIONS OF THE COURT, BUT THE RESULT IS NONETHELESS 
2 0 THE SAME. THERE HAS EVEN BE REFERENCE, IF I MAY RIGHT 
21 NOW, TO A NEW CHANGE OF CIRCUMSTANCES, THAT MR. 
22 CALLAHAN IS SEPARATELY EMPLOYED. WE HAVEN'T GOT THAT 
23 IN FRONT OF THAT COURT, BUT WE DID TAKE THE SUP ORDER 
24 DEPOSITION A FEW DAYS AGO AND THE COURT WAS INVOLVED BY 
25 TELEPHONE CONFERENCE. AND IF I MAY, HE HAS TAKEN 
EMPLOYMENT WITH A COMPANY IN TEXAS, WHICH IS A TWO-MAN 
COMPANY, AND HE OPERATES OUT OF HIS HOME AND HE CALLS 
THE SAME CUSTOMERS OFFERING SERVICES OF THE SAME TYPE 
AND HE'S CONSULTING WITH C-H INDUSTRIES, YOU KNOW, 
ASSISTING MR. WOOD IN LEARNING HOW TO SELL TO THE SAME 
CUSTOMERS THE VERY-SAME PARTS. 
IT'S ANOTHER STEP, AND I'M NOT BRINGING THAT 
BEFORE THE COURT RIGHT NOW. WE'LL DO THAT BY SEPARATE 
PROCEEDINGS. BUT IF I MAY, THE ARGUMENT OF EQUITY, WE 
HAVE ANOTHER STEP WHERE HE'S GOING TO TRY TO DO THE 
SAME THING WITH A LITTLE DIFFERENT VARIATION. 
BUT IF I MAY, THE ISSUE RIGHT NOW IS WHETHER 
OR NOT WE PROCEED BY WRIT OF EXECUTION, AND THE ONLY 
COMMENT I HEARD THAT I THINK WOULD B E — THAT THE COURT 
SHOULD CONSIDER IS WHETHER OR NOT YOU SHOULD HAVE THE 
EXECUTION RESULT IN A LEVY ON THE ASSETS AND THE SALE 
AT PUBLIC AUCTION OR WHETHER WE SHOULD JUST TRANSFER 
THE ASSETS TO EIMCO AND END UP WITH SOME TYPE OF STEPS 
TO EVALUATE THEM. EITHER PROCEDURE IS AVAILABLE AND 
PERMITTED UNDER THE RULES. 
WE HAVE SUGGESTED THE TRANSFER BECAUSE THOSE 
ASSETS WOULD BE VALUED, AS THE G & G ASSETS WERE 
VALUED, PROBABLY MUCH HIGHER THAN ANY AUCTION PRICE 
WOULD BRING. WE VALUED G & G ASSETS THAT EIMCO TOOK AT 
THE VALUE THEY WERE VALUED AT TWO YEARS AGO-- EXCUSE 
1 ? 
1 ME, IN 1989, WHEN THEY FILED THEIR PETITIONS IN 
2 BANKRUPTCY. WITH THE SIZE OF THE JUDGEMENT THAT'S 
3 INVOLVED, THE VALUATION OF C-H INDUSTRIES WOULD BE 
4 QUITE GENEROUS IN FAVOR OF C-H, IF I MAY, AND STILL 
5 FALL SHORT OF GETTING CLOSE TO SATISFYING THE 
6 JUDGEMENT. THAT'S THE ONLY ISSUE.. 
7 I THINK THE PRACTICAL APPROACH WE'RE 
8 SUGGESTING WHICH IS WE'LL TAKE OVER THOSE ASSETS AND 
9 THAT WOULD GIVE EIMCO THE OPPORTUNITY TO FILL ANY OF 
10 THE CONTRACTS THAT WOULD REMAIN EXECUTORY AT THE TIME 
11 THAT THE ASSETS WERE REQUIRED BY THE CONSTABLE. 
12 THE BUSINESS IS THE ALTER EGO OF 
13 MR. CALLAHAN. THERE ISN'T ANY DOUBT ABOUT IT. HE 
14 CONTINUES TO OPERATE IT, MANIPULATE IT, EVEN THOUGH 
15 HE'S NOW SET UP A SEPARATE CHARADE. 
16 TO ATTACK THE COURT'S JUDGEMENT NOW THIS LONG 
17 AFTER IT HAS BEEN DECIDED I THINK IS INAPPROPRIATE AND 
18 IMPROPER. HIS REMEDY IS WITH THE APPELLATE COURT, AND 
19 HE CERTAINLY IS AWARE OF THE REMEDY BECAUSE YOU SIGNED 
20 AN ORDER, YOUR HONOR, EXTENDING HIS APPEAL PERIOD 30 
21 DAYS SO HE COULD FILE YET AN APPEAL SOMETIME BETWEEN 
22 NOW AND THE END OF THE MONTH. 
23 UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES, ABSENT A STAY, I 
24 THINK WE SHOULD PROCEED WITH THE WRIT OF EXECUTION. 
25 THERE ISN'T ANYTHING THAT IS A LEGAL IMPEDIMENT TO DO. 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
FADEL: 
MR. FADEL. 
YOUR HONOR. FIRST OF ALL WITH 
RESPECT TO HIS COMMENTS ABOUT MR. CALLAHAN'S PRESENT 
EMPLOYMENT, HE'S ACTUALLY EMPLOYED BY THAT TEXAS 
COMPANY AND IS ENGAGED AS HE INDICATED IN CALLING ON 
CUSTOMERS WHO 
COURT 
HAVE FILTER EQUIPMENT,.. WHATEVER.. THE 
DIDN'T RESTRAIN 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
FADEL: 
BUT THE PROFIT IN THE 
HE'S 
HERE. 
WIFE 
THIS 
OF MR 
HIM FROM DOING THAT. 
NO. 
AND C-H IS ONE OF THE SUPPLIERS, 
BUSINESS IS SOMEBODY ELSE'S. 
STILL GOING TO CONSULT. 
THE COURT: THAT'S THE PROBLEM I'VE GOT 
I GRANT YOU THAT SOME OF THESE RELATIVES, THE 
AND-- IS 
MR. 
THE 
COMPANY, 
IT A SON? 
ROSSA: 
COURT: 
BUT THE 
SON-IN-LAW. 
-- SON-IN-LAW HAVE INVESTED IN 
WHOLE PURPOSE OF THIS IS BECAUSE 
. CALLAHAN; WITHOUT HIM THEY CAN'T FUNCTION. 
MR. 
ANYBODY ELSE. 
THEM. 
THE 
MR. 
THE 
FADEL: 
COURT: 
FADEL: 
COURT: 
LET'S ASSUME HE WORKED FOR 
WELL, HE CAN GO TO WORK--
SOMEBODY PUTS UP THE MONEY FOR 
NO. IF HE WENT TO WORK FOR 
SOMEONE ELSE AND HE CONTACTED THE EIMCO CUSTOMERS, 
14 
1 THERE'S NOTHING I CAN DO ABOUT IT. HE CAN CONTACT THE 
2 CUSTOMERS AND DO WHATEVER HE WANTED TO DO IN THAT 
3 REGARD, BECAUSE HE WOULDN'T BE USING ANY OF THE EIMCO 
4 DRAWINGS OR SO FORTH. 
5 BUT HERE, HE TOOK FROM ONE COMPANY— CREATED 
6 C.-.H., AND ALL HE JJAS BEEN .DOING IS JUST -GETTING AROUND A 
7 COURT ORDER. AND HE THINKS BY CREATING THE CORPORATION 
8 HE SOMEHOW ABSOLVES HIMSELF FROM THE JUDGEMENT THAT WAS 
9 ENTERED. AND I DON'T WANT TO SEE MR. WOOD OR ANYONE 
10 ELSE SUFFER AS A RESULT OF THIS EXECUTION, BUT THAT'S 
11 THE RISK THEY RAN WHEN THEY ELECTED TO TAKE THIS ROUTE 
12 TO GET AROUND THE JUDGEMENT THAT WAS ENTERED BY THE 
13 COURT. 
14 MR. FADEL: BUT DOES THE COURT BELIEVE THEY 
15 USED ANY EIMCO DRAWINGS? 
16 THE COURT: I DON'T KNOW. I DON'T KNOW THAT. 
17 MR. FADEL: WELL, WE HAD THE PEOPLE HERE AND 
18 WHEN THEY TESTIFIED THEY MADE THE DRAWINGS ON COMPUTER, 
19 THE COURT SAID HE DIDN'T DOUBT THAT AT THE TIME, 
20 WOULDN'T LET HIM TESTIFY ANY MORE. 
21 THE COURT: WELL, THEY COULD--
22 MR. ROSSA: NOT AN ISSUE. 
23 THE COURT: THAT'S NOT AN ISSUE. 
24 MR. FADEL: ALL RIGHT. BUT THE IDEA HERE IS 
25 THAT THERE'S NO PROOF THAT THEY USED ANY EIMCO DRAWINGS 
SINCE THE DATE OF THE JUDGEMENT. ABSOLUTELY NO PROOF. 
MR. ROSSA: NEVER RAISED THAT ISSUE. 
MR. FADEL: NOW, JUST BECAUSE HE HAS 
RELATIVES FINANCING HIM, IT SHOULDN'T BE DIFFERENT FROM 
ANYBODY ELSE FINANCING HIM AS LONG AS HE DOESN'T USE 
EIMCO DRAWINGS. 
NOW, ONCE AGAIN WITH RESPECT TO THE WRIT OF 
EXECUTION, I DON'T SEE ANYTHING IN THE RULE THAT SAYS 
IT'S PROPER TO TURN THE ASSETS OVER TO THE JUDGMENT 
CREDIT TO EVALUATE AND APPLY. NOTHING IN THAT RULE 
THAT SAYS THAT. 
THE COURT: NOW, MR. ROSSA, WHAT DO YOU HAVE 
TO SAY? 
MR. ROSSA: WELL, IT'S AN ISSUE THAT HAS 
CLEARLY BEEN ARGUED BEFORE. I HATE TO RETRACE THE 
ARGUMENT, BUT SIMPLY STATED THE QUESTION WITH RESPECT 
TO CONTEMPT WAS THE FACT THAT HE JUST TOOK G & G, LEFT 
BEHIND A FEW DESKS AND THE COMPUTER AND CONTINUED ON 
WITH THE BUSINESS. AND MR. FADEL, YOU KNOW, ARGUES THE 
QUESTION OF DRAWINGS, WHAT HE TOOK, EXECUTORY CONTRACTS 
AND EXISTING CUSTOMERS AND WHAT HAVE YOU. 
SO WE HAVE BEEN DOWN THAT ROAD AND MR. FADEL 
REFUSES TO ACCEPT THAT. EVEN THOUGH IT'S STATUTORILY 
NOW THE LAW OF THE STATE OF UTAH THAT A CUSTOMER LIST 
IS IN FACT A TRADE SECRET, HE STILL ARGUES THAT HE CAN 
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1 GO TALK TO THE CUSTOMERS OF G & G STEEL WHEN THAT'S 
2 CLEARLY AN ASSET OF G & G STEEL. 
3 THE COURT: THAT'S A PROBLEM THAT I HAVE GOT 
4 HERE. THAT'S EXACTLY THE PROBLEM. 
5 MR. ROSSA: SO WE HAD C-H, WHICH IS G & G 
6 STEEL WITH A DIFFERENT NAME. AND- THERE IS NOT ONE 
7 PIECE OF EVIDENCE IN FRONT OF THIS COURT, NOT ONE, THAT 
8 SAYS THAT ANYBODY OTHER THAN IONE CALLAHAN AND GERALD 
9 CALLAHAN HAVE DONE ANYTHING WITH RESPECT TO 
10 CONTRIBUTING TO THE BUSINESS TO CREATE C-H. AND IN 
11 FACT, MR. CALLAHAN TESTIFIED THAT HE BORROWED THE MONEY 
12 FROM THE DAUGHTER IN CHICAGO IN ORDER TO HELP THE 
13 BUSINESS GET STARTED. HE BORROWED 3,000 AND PAID IT 
14 BACK AS A LOAN. 
15 SO THE ONLY TESTIMONY WE HAVE IN FRONT OF 
16 THIS COURT AS FAR AS OWNERSHIP OF THAT BUSINESS IS HE 
17 IS USING HIS WIFE AS A FRONT TO BE THE SHAREHOLDER FOR 
18 HIS BENEFIT. AND THEN UNDER ADVICE OF COUNSEL HE'S 
19 DONE EVERYTHING HE CAN TO MAKE IT LOOK LIKE HE'S 
20 SOMEHOW OR ANOTHER NOT THE WOLF THAT HE IS, HE'S IN 
21 SOME OTHER CAPACITY, HE'S AN INNOCENT LAMB. 
22 AND I SUGGEST THAT HERE WE'RE DEALING WITH A 
23 STAY; SHOULD WE STAY THIS PARTICULAR DOCUMENT? HE'S 
24 NOT ASKED FOR A STAY IN FRONT OF THIS COURT. HE 
25 DELIBERATELY SKIPPED THIS COURT WITH RESPECT TO SEEKING 
A STAY AND THERE IS NO LEGAL IMPEDIMENT IN PROCEEDING 
WITH THE EXECUTION PURSUANT TO THE COURT'S ORDER. 
MR. FADEL: YOUR HONOR, WE HAVE THESE OTHER 
PEOPLE WHO HAVE LEGITIMATE INVESTMENTS. WHAT ABOUT 
THE CREDITORS IN CONNECTION WITH THESE ASSETS? WE'VE 
GOT THE INVESTMENTS OF THOSE OTHER . P.EOPLE. GOING TO 
TAKE ALL OF ASSETS AND LEAVE ALL THE CREDITORS? 
THE COURT: WELL, AS TO WHAT EXTENT THE 
CREDITORS HAVE A SECURITY INTEREST IN THOSE ASSETS, I 
GUESS-
MR. FADEL: WELL--
THE COURT: — GENERAL CONTRACTORS, THEY MAY 
WIND UP WITH NOTHING. 
MR. FADEL: BUT C-H IS NOT THE JUDGMENT 
DEBTOR HERE. 
THE COURT: I UNDERSTAND. BUT WHAT HAS 
HAPPENED HERE IS EXACTLY WHAT MR. ROSSA SAID. HE TOOK 
WHAT ONE CORPORATION HAS AND CREATED-- LET THE OTHER 
ONE GO AND CREATED ANOTHER ONE, AS I SAID MANY TIMES, 
TO CIRCUMVENT WHAT THIS COURT ORDERED HIM NOT TO DO. 
NOW, IF HE WANTED TO GO WORK FOR SOME OTHER COMPANY 
INDEPENDENT OF C-H, GO TO WORK FOR THEM, I GUESS HE CAN 
DO PRETTY MUCH WHAT HE WANTED TO DO SO LONG AS HE 
DIDN'T USE EIMCO'S DRAWINGS AND SO FORTH. 
MR. FADEL: WHAT IF HE JUST WAS THE COMPANY 
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1 HIMSELF? 
2 THE COURT: IF HE WAS THE COMPANY HIMSELF? 
3 MR. FADEL: YES. 
4 THE COURT: IF HE WAS C-H HIMSELF? 
5 MR. FADEL: YES. 
6 MR. ROSSA: IF I MAY, YOUR HONOB, ONE OF THE 
7 THINGS THAT IS PROVEN TO BE A TRAP IS A STATEMENT MADE 
8 IN THE PROPER LEGAL CONTEXT BY THE COURT THAT HAS BEEN 
9 MISINTERPRETED BY THE DEFENDANTS TO CREATE A CONTINUING 
10 SCENARIO. NOW WE'RE GOING TO GO THROUGH ANOTHER 
11 SCENARIO WHERE MR. CALLAHAN IS OFF, TRYING SOMETHING 
12 ELSE IN A SLIGHTLY DIFFERENT CONTEXT. THE CLEAR 
13 REALITY IS THAT THE ASSETS OF G & G STEEL CONTINUE TO 
14 BE USED BY MR. CALLAHAN THROUGH C-H INDUSTRIES, AND 
15 THAT'S THE LONG AND SHORT OF IT. 
16 MR. FADEL: WELL, NOW, YOUR HONOR, LET'S LOOK 
17 AT IT THIS WAY. IF HE HAD GONE INTO BUSINESS HIMSELF 
18 AND HE DID JUST EXACTLY WHAT HE DID, HE HAD A RIGHT TO 
19 GO CALL ON ANY CUSTOMERS HE KNEW AND--
20 THE COURT: WELL, HE DIDN'T DO THAT. THIS IS 
21 THE POINT HE MISSES. HE TOOK WHAT HE SHOULDN'T HAVE 
22 TAKEN FROM G & G STEEL AND CREATED ANOTHER 
23 CORPORATION. AND I DON'T KNOW WHAT HE TOOK FROM THERE, 
24 BUT EVIDENTLY THAT'S WHAT HE DID. AND YOU SAID BECAUSE 
25 HE HAD ORDERS AND HE FILLED THEM, HE SHOULDN'T HAVE 
DONE THAT. 
MR. FADEL: WAIT A MINUTE. ON THAT RESPECT 
RIGHT THERE, YOUR HONOR, HE DIDN'T TAKE ANY OF THOSE 
ORDERS. 
G & G CANCELLED THE ORDERS AND THIS COURT HAD 
RESTRAINED G & -G.FROM-SELLING. HE CALLED.ON -THE 
CUSTOMERS. EIMCO COULD HAVE DONE IT. ANYBODY ELSE 
COULD HAVE DONE IT. 
THE COURT: THAT WAS HIS MISTAKE. THAT WAS 
HIS MISTAKE. HE SHOULD HAVE JUST LET THESE ORDERS BE 
AND-- LET THEM BE AND LET SOMEONE ELSE FILL THEM AND 
THEN STARTED ANEW; HE WOULDN'T BE HERE TODAY. 
MR. FADEL: BUT IF HE HAD DONE THAT, G & G 
STEEL WOULD HAVE HAD THE LIABILITY OF NOT FILLING THOSE 
ORDERS. 
THE COURT: AND THEY TOOK OVER G & G STEEL. 
MR. ROSSA: WE JUST TOOK THE ASSETS. THE 
SHELL STILL EXISTS. 
MR. FADEL: WE SAVED THEM FROM THE LIABILITY. 
THE COURT: WELL, I DIDN'T SAVE THEM FROM 
ANY LIABILITY. IF THE COMPANY WAS TAKEN OVER BY 
SOMEONE ELSE, WHO WOULD THEY SUE. THEY'D SUE THE 
COMPANY. THEY COULDN'T SUE CALLAHAN. THEY WOULD HAVE 
SUED G & G STEEL. 
MR. FADEL: THEY WOULD HAVE SUED G & G AND 
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THAT WOULD MEAN THAT G & G HAD LESS ASSETS. 
THE 
MR. 
THEY LOST IT. 
COURT: RIGHT. 
FADEL: BUT WHAT HAVE WE TAKEN 
SHOULDN'T LET IT BE A DOG IN 
RULE THIS THING. 
THE COURT: WELL, SO IT APPEARS TO 
UNDER THE CIRCUMSTANCES HERE UNLESS THERE'S 
OF VALUE? 
A MANGER 
ME THAT 
A STAY, YOU 
MOVE FOR A STAY OF THIS WRIT, THAT I DON'T HAVE MUCH 
CHOICE BUT TO 
CIRCUMSTANCES 
THIS COURT. 
MR. 
IN HIS MINUTE 
MONTHS LATER, 
GO AHEAD AND ISSUE IT BASED ON THE 
AND THE FACTS THAT HAVE BEEN PRESENTED TO 
FADEL: WELL, YOUR HONOR DIDN' T FIND THAT 
ENTRY INITIALLY. AND THEN THEY, TWO 
PREPARE SOME LENGTHY FINDINGS 
FORTH AND SUGGEST THESE MATTERS--
THE COURT: THOSE MINUTE ENTRIES, 
AND SO 
I DON'T 
PURPORT TO ITEMIZE OR DETAIL THEM. AND I SAY THAT IN 
ALL OF MY FINDINGS, BECAUSE IF THAT WERE THE 
I WOULD BE HERE FOREVER. I WOULD NEVER GET 
MR. FADEL: NOW, IN THE MECHANICS 
YOU SAY THE JUDGEMENT CREDITOR CAN GO IN AND 
OF THOSE ASSETS, ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, IGNORE 
ACCOUNTS PAYABLE AND TAKE WHATEVER ASSETS. 
THEY'VE GOT TO DETERMINE THE OWNERSHIP, AND 
THE FURNITURE ISN'T OWNED BY C-H INDUSTRIES. 
CASE THEN 
THROUGH. 
OF THIS, 
TAKE ALL 
THE 
OF COURSE 
ACTUALLY 
THE COURT: AS I SAY, THEY HAVE GOT TO MAKE 
THE DETERMINATION AS TO THE OWNERSHIP AND WHOEVER MAY 
HAVE PRIOR CLAIMS OR LIENS AGAINST ANY OF THE ASSETS OF 
C-H. 
MR. ROSSA: THE FURNITURE IS OWNED BY CAL 
WEST JLEASING., WHICH IS IONE CALLAHAN. SHE 'S THE OWNER 
OF IT. 
MR. FADEL: THAT HAS BEEN THE CASE FOR A LONG 
TIME. SHE WAS THE OWNER WHEN SHE LEASED IT TO G & G. 
THAT WASN'T DONE IN CONNECTION WITH THIS. 
AND THERE AGAIN, YOU WANT TO IGNORE THE 
WOMEN'S RIGHTS AGAIN. 
THE COURT: I'M NOT IGNORING ANYBODY'S 
RIGHTS. BUT SHE MAY BE PART OF THIS WRONGFUL CONTACT. 
IF SHE IS GOING TO ACT AS THE FRONT AND— LET'S FACE 
IT, C-H OR G & G WOULD BE NOTHING WITHOUT GERALD 
CALLAHAN; ISN'T THAT CORRECT? 
MR. FADEL: NO, IT'S NOT CORRECT. 
THE COURT: OKAY. 
MR. FADEL: THEY CAN OPERATE TODAY WITHOUT 
HIM AND THEY ARE OPERATING TODAY WITHOUT HIM. 
THE COURT: AND HE'S NOT A CONSULTANT? 
MR. FADEL: HE'S IS A CONSULTANT--
THE COURT: HE'S A CONSULTANT. S O — 
MR. FADEL: WELL, WHAT DIFFERENCE DOES IT 
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MAKE WHO 
TO ALLOW 
THE CONSULTANT IS? 
THE COURT: 
THE WRIT OF ] 
SIGN. IF YOU WANT TO 
WELL, I' 'LL TELL YOU, I AM GOING 
EXECUTION. I'LL GO AHEAD AND 
GET A STAY, YOU CAN GO AHEAD AND 
GET A STAY AND I'LL HEAR THAT. 
HEARING AS TO-
MR. 
--
ROSSA: 
YOU MAY HAVE TO HAVE A 
YOUR HONOR, SINCE MR. WOOD WHO IS 
THE GENERAL MANAGER OF C-H INDUSTRIES IS IN THE 
COURTROOM AND 
ORALLY ENJOIN 
TRANSFER 
PRESENT 
HIM AT » 
, I WOULD REQUEST THAT THE COURT 
rHIS POINT OR ORDER HIM NOT TO 
OR PERMIT ANY ASSETS OR CASH TO BE TRANSFERRED 
PENDING SERVICE OF THAT WRIT OF EXECUTION. 
HE KNOWS 
HE'S NOT 
WRIT AND 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
ROSSA: 
I CAN'T 
HE'S IN 
WHERE THEY ARE. 
THE 
PART 
THEN 
SHOULD SAY— 
MR. 
COURT: 
OF THIS 
WHOEVER 
FADEL: 
I KNOW, 
ACTION. 
DO THAT. 
CHARGE OF THOSE ASSETS. 
BUT I CAN'T DO THAT. 
ALL I CAN DO IS SIGN THE 
EXECUTES— WHOEVER SERVES, I 
WELL, THESE ACCOUNTS RECEIVABLE, 
BECAUSE THEY DIDN'T HAVE THE CASH FLOW, HAD TO BE 
FACTORED 
ELSE. 
r AND 
THE 
MR. 
THEY'RE 
COURT: 
FADEL: 
ALREADY 
THAT'S 
NOW, WE 
FACTORED TO SOMEBODY 
FINE. 
SHOULD BE ABLE TO COME TO 
THIS 
AND 
COURT TO 
SO FORTH. 
DETERMINE THE 
WE SHOULDN'T 
COURT OR ANYBODY ELSE. WE 
RIGHT HERE. 
WILL 
WILL 
YOU 
THE 
GO AHEAD 
MR. 
THE 
COURT: 
AND--
ROSSA: 
COURT: 
BE DETERMINED. 
TIME FOR 1 
AS ' 
ACCOUNTS THAT 
MR. 
THE 
MR. 
HEARING 
rO WHAT' 
I 'LL 
WE'LL 
OWNERSHIP OF THOSE 
HAVE TO GO TO THE 
OUGHT TO BE ABLE TO 
ENTER THE WRIT AND 
ASSETS 
FEDERAL 
GET IT 
THEN YOU 
HAVE A CONSTABLE SERVE IT. 
-- SERVE IT AND THEN OWNERSHIP 
WE'LL 
AS TO 
HAVE A HEARING. I' 
THE OWNERSHIP. 
S FACTORED, THEY ONLY GET 
ARE THERE TO 
FADEL: 
COURT: 
BERRY: 
THAT' 
OKAY. 
YOUR 
BECAUSE WE HAD CONFUSION IN 
FROM 
MR. 
JUST 
ANY 
HIS 
THE BENCH TO MR. 
CALLAHAN, 
FADEL 
GET. THAT'S ALL. 
S TRUE. 
I'LL SIGN IT THEN 
HONOR, JUST FOR THE 
LL GIVE 
THE 
• 1 
RECORD, 
THE PAST ABOUT STATEMENTS 
AND THE DEFENDANTS 
ABOUT WHAT THEY CAN AND CAN'T DO 
LIKE TO ASK THE 
REFERENCE 
COURT 
THE COURT MAY 
OWN HE CAN DO WHATEVER 
THE 
MR. 
COURT: 
BERRY: 
NO, I 
TO DELETE FROM THE 
/ I 
, I WOULD 
RECORD 
HAVE MADE IF HE GOES OUT ON 
HE WANTS TO DO. 
'M NOT GOING TO DO 
THE CUSTOMER LIST-- ALL 
SAYING, YOUR HONOR, IS THAT 
PHRASE SO THERE IS NC 
YOU LEFT IT OUT OF 
1 MISSTATEMENT THAT HE CAN 
THAT. 
I'M 
THAT 
'T GO OUT 
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AND USE THE CUSTOMERS OF G & G 
THOSE CUSTOMER LISTS 
UNIFORM TRADE SECRET 
THE COURT: 
THAT ARE 
ACT. 
I CAN'T 
BUT THOSE-- AND I DON'T VIEW— 
CASE EVERY DAY, AND I HAVE ALL 
OR C-H OR EIMCO. IT'S 
TRADE SECRETS UNDER THE 
USE THAT OR THE DRAWINGS, 
YOU'RE WORKING WITH THIS 
THESE. OTHER -CASES. I 
DON'T RECALL THE EXACT LANGUAGE OF THE JUDGEMENT. I'LL 
HAVE TO LOOK AT THE JUDGEMENT AND MAKE SURE, BUT SO 
LONG AS HE FOLLOWS THE JUDGEMENT HE CAN DO WHATEVER HE 
WANTS. 
MR. ROSSA: 
SOMETHING. 
THE COURT: 
JUDGEMENT HE CAN GO 
AS LONG AS HE DOESN'T VIOLATE 
IF HE FOLLOWS THE TERMS OF THE 
OUT AND DO WHAT HE WANTS BECAUSE I 
THINK I EMPHASIZED THAT I'M NOT GOING TO DEPRIVE HIM OF 
BEING COMPETITIVE. 
ACCORDANCE WITH THE 
MR. BERRY: 
THE COURT: 
MR. FADEL: 
BUT HE HAS 
JUDGEMENT. 
AND THE 
YES. 
TO BE COMPETITIVE IN 
LAW. 
NOW, THERE IS NO EVIDENCE THAT 
THE G & G CUSTOMER LIST OR THE 
SECRET. 
THE COURT: 
JUDGEMENT BEFORE ME, 
MR. FADEL: 
WELL, AS 
SO I CAN' 
C-H AND 
C-H CUSTOMER LIST WERE 
I SAY, I DON'T HAVE THE 
T RECALL EVERY TERM. 
G & G-- THEY NEVER DID 
DECLARE THAT EITHER OF THOSE CUSTOMER LISTS WERE 
SECRET. 
THE COURT: PUT IT THIS WAY— 
MR. ROSSA: WE'RE CONFUSED AGAIN. 
THE COURT: LOOK, I'LL CLEAR IT UP RIGHT 
NOW. HE IS NOT TO VIOLATE-- LET ME PUT IT THIS WAY. 
HE CAN CONDUCT HIS BUSINESS SO LONG AS HE 
DOES NOT VIOLATE THE TERMS AND CONDITIONS OF THE 
JUDGEMENT. 
MR. FADEL: NOW, YOUR HONOR--
MR. ROSSA: OKAY. 
MR. FADEL: DOES THAT MEAN THAT-- YOUR HONOR 
INDICATED THAT HE SHOULDN'T HAVE ANY CONNECTION AT ALL 
WITH C-H. NOW, WHY WOULD THAT BE? 
THE COURT: THE REASON I'M SAYING THAT ABOUT 
C-H IS THAT IT'S NOTHING MORE THAN AN ATTEMPT BY 
MR. CALLAHAN TO CIRCUMVENT WHAT I ORDERED HIM NOT TO 
DO. AND SO, GET THE JUDGEMENT OUT, LOOK AT IT AND THEN 
OUTLINE HIS CONDUCT IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE JUDGEMENT. 
MR. FADEL: SO IF HE DOES, THROUGH C-H, 
ANYTHING THAT'S CONSISTENT WITH THE JUDGEMENT, THAT'S 
ALL RIGHT; IS THAT RIGHT? 
THE COURT: IF HE WORKS FOR C-H AND HE 
DOESN'T VIOLATE THE TERMS OF THE JUDGEMENT, THERE'S 
NOTHING I CAN DO ABOUT IT. 
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MR. FADEL: 
THE COURT: 
THAT'S FINE. 
WHAT ELSE CAN YOU-- YOU CAN'T DO 
ANYTHING MORE THAN THAT, ONLY ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE 
JUDGEMENT. 
MR. ROSSA: ENFORCE THE TERMS OF THE 
JUDGEMENT.AND, OF COURSE, SOME OF THIS TRACESBACK TO 
THE RESTRAINING ORDER, , RESTRAINING FROM TRANSFERRING 
ASSETS, AND ONE OF THE CLEAR ASSETS OF G & G IS THE 
CUSTOMER LIST. 
THE COURT: 
MR. ROSSA: 
UP IN A LITTLE BIT OF 
MR. CALLAHAN— EXCUSE 
WILLING TO ACCEPT THE 
RIGHT. 
AND THAT'S WHERE WE KEEP ENDING 
A MISCOMMUNICATION WHERE 
M E — MR. FADEL SEEMS TO NOT BE 
FACT THAT A CUSTOMER LIST IS A 
PIECE OF PROPERTY THAT CANNOT BE USED. AND THIS COURT 
HAS RESTRAINED MR. CALLAHAN FROM TRANSFERRING OR USING 
THAT PARTICULAR-- THE ASSETS OF G & G STEEL, AND HE 
CONTINUED TO DO SO, IF I MAY, AND I WOULD SUGGEST THAT 
I UNDERSTAND THE COURT'S COMMENTS JUST NOW TO BE 
CONSISTENT WITH THAT, WHICH MEANS CALLAHAN GOING OFF TO 
DO BUSINESS WITH SOMEBODY ELSE, HE CAN'T USE THAT 
CUSTOMER LIST. 
MR. FADEL: 
THE COURT: 
BUT THE CUSTOMERS ARE OUT THERE. 
NO. I CAN CUT THROUGH ALL THIS. 
AS I SAID TO BOTH OF YOU, GET THE JUDGEMENT OUT, READ 
IT AND ACT ACCORDINGLY, AND WHATEVER THE JUDGEMENT 
SAYS, THAT'S WHAT YOU 
MR. FADEL: 
CUSTOMER LIST. 
THE COURT: 
THAT'S WHAT YOU DO. 
MR. FADEL: 
THE COURT: 
ENTERED. 
MR. FADEL: 
THE COURT: 
GO AND PROCEED. 
DO. 
IT DOESN'T SAY ONE WORD ABOUT A 
ALL RIGHT. WHATEVER IT SAYS, 
ALL RIGHT. 
THAT'S ALL I CAN DO. THAT'S BEEN 
ALL RIGHT. 
BUT I'LL SIGN THE WRIT SO YOU CAN 
I HAVE SIGNED IT AS OF NOW. 
MR. ROSSA: 
ISSUED AND SERVED. 
MR. FADEL: 
THE EXECUTION THAT IT 
THE COURT: 
THANK YOU. WE'LL CAUSE IT TO BE 
THE COURT ISN'T AUTHORIZING IN 
GO BEYOND WHAT THE RULES ALLOW? 
NO, NO. YOU'VE GOT TO FOLLOW THE 
RULES. WHATEVER THE RULES SAY AND WHAT THE JUDGEMENT 
SAYS, THAT'S WHAT YOU DO. AND THAT WAY, WHAT I SAY 
FROM THE BENCH OR-- IS NOT CONTROLLING BECAUSE I AM 
BOUND BY THAT JUDGEMENT, AND I DON'T HAVE IT BEFORE 
ME. 
SO DON'T HOLD WHAT YOUR CONDUCT IS FROM WHAT 
I SAY FROM THE BENCH HERE, BECAUSE I CAN'T ALTER WHAT I 
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ALREADY SIGNED UNLESS WE HAVE A HEARING TO HAVE ME 
ALTER IT OR AMEND IT. SO REMEMBER THAT, BECAUSE I JUST 
CAN'T REMEMBER EVERYTHING I DO HERE. AND I CAN 
GUARANTEE YOU THAT. 
OKAY. COURT'S IN RECESS. 
(THE PROCEEDINGS WERE CONCLUDED.) 
C E R T I F I C A T E 
I, KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, AN OFFICIAL COURT 
REPORTER FOR THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND 
FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH, DO HEREBY CERTIFY 
THAT I REPORTED THE ABOVE-ENTITLED MATTER ON AUGUST 6, 
1991, AND THAT THE PRECEDING PAGES 1 THROUGH 29, 
INCLUSIVE, COMPRISE A TRUE AND CORRECT REPORTER'S 
TRANSCRIPTION OF SAID PROCEEDINGS. 
DATED THIS 22ND DAY OF FEBRUARY, 1993. 
KATHLEEN SCHULTZ, C.S.R. 
OFFICIAL COURT REPORTER 
Tab 2 
By. 
Triirti Judicial District 
MAY 2 8 1993 
Deputy Clerk 
VAN COTT, BAGLEY, CORNWALL & MCCARTHY 
William G. Fowler (1107) 
James D. Gilson (5472) 
Attorneys for C-H Industries, Inc. 
50 South Main Street, Suite 1600 
P. 0. Box 45340 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84145 
Telephone: (801) 532-3333 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
ENVIROTECH CORPORATION dba 
EIMCO PROCESS EQUIPMENT 
COMPANY, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
G & G STEEL CORPORATION, a 
Utah Corporation; GERALD A. 
CALLAHAN, an individual; 
GLEN 0. HANSEN, an individual, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Civil No.C88-5429 
Honorable John A. Rokich 
The case came on for hearing before the Court on April 
5, 1993 on the Motion of C-H Industries, Inc. ("C-H") to Quash 
Plaintiff s Writs of Execution and Assistance Dated 3/4/93. C-H 
was represented by William G. Fowler and James D. Gilson. 
Plaintiff Envirotech Corporation, dba Eimco Process Equipment 
Company ("Eimco"), was represented by Thomas J. Rossa and A. 
John Pate. Having duly considered the argument of counsel, and 
the memoranda submitted by the C-H and Eimco,
 /A/ ^Uis y^,,^ &Atr/tv <4 
* ^/>^/c ft Iff J J 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that Eimco may not attach or ^j/J 
s e i z e £H^^^a-u^^g~Q^--a^tien--or claims that C--H- hao against EimcD ^ 
'W?«±nx3-ncm^ —siich-ftg- the pending act ion brought by 
iqnPQQRil > 
C-H against Eimco in the United States District Court for the t^ Jt^ -
D i s t r i c t of Utah, Case No. 92-C-1020B; ffy fi>cA,Mr//?r 7e>r/t/s cover 
A 
IT IS FURTHER ORDERED that C-H's Motion to Quash is 
denied in all other respects. 
DATED this ,^  f day of May, 1993. 
BY THE COURT: 
[ohji A. Rokich, Judge 
Third Judicial District Court 
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